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Abstract 
Since 1 January 2013, the German interurban bus market is deregulated. As a consequence 
of deregulation, the number of interurban bus passengers has increased from 2.5 million in 
2012 to 24 million in 2016. Today there is a dense interurban bus network covering the whole 
German territory. In parallel to the interurban bus network, which is operated mostly by 
private companies, there is a network of regional railway services that is subsidized by public 
funds. In order to prevent cannibalization of regional railway services, interurban bus 
companies are allowed to offer their services only where the distance between two cities is at 
least 50 kilometres and the regional train takes at least one hour. Despite these restrictions, 
there is still competition between the two modes of transportation. The present paper gives 
some insight into the intermodal competition between interurban buses and regional railways 
as well as into the financial impact of the new interurban bus market on the regional railway 
market. For this purpose, we have combined regional railway, geographical and interurban 
bus data. Our estimation shows that the financial impact of interurban bus competition on the 
entire regional railway system is relatively low.  
 
1. Introduction 
The German market for interurban bus transport was deregulated on 1 January 2013. Since 
then, the market has developed quite dynamically. In the beginning, a lot of bus companies 
entered the market, including Postbus, Megabus and MeinFernbus. Since January 2015, the 
number of independent players has been reduced significantly due to a process of 
consolidation. Finally, in June 2016, the company FlixBus (a merger between Flixbus and 
MeinFernbus) had a market share of around 90%, measured in scheduled kilometres on all 
connections (IGES Institut, 2017). Concurrently the number of interurban bus passengers 
increased from 2.5 million in 2012 to 24 million in 2016 (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017a). 
According to §42a of the Public Transport Act, interurban bus companies are allowed to 
serve customers with connections of at least 50 kilometres length and a minimum regional 
railway travel time of at least 60 minutes. These limitations are designed to avoid 
cannibalization of the regional rail transport which is subsidised with public funds. 
Nevertheless, there is still a large number of connections above the aforementioned 
limitations that puts the publicly subsidised regional railway transport and the interurban 
buses in direct competition. According to a survey conducted by the IGES Institute, 12% of 
current interurban bus customers were previously customers of the regional rail transport 
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system (IGES Institut, 2014). The aim of this paper is to provide insight into intermodal 
competition between the interurban buses and the regional railway. Furthermore, this paper 
calculates the financial impact due to cannibalization of the regional rail transport by 
interurban buses. For that purpose, Section 2 describes and compares the cost situation in 
both markets. Based on data gathered on both markets, Section 3 identifies those 
connections that are affected by intermodal competition and compares the offered services 
regarding their frequencies and travel times. Finally, Section 4 presents the losses in sale 
and discusses the results. 
 
2. Background 
2.1. Public regional railway transport in Germany 
Regional public transportation in Germany is considered to be a service for the public, 
according to the Regionalisation Act (§1(1) RegG). This law requires the nationwide 
realization of public transportation on a local-level. According to § 1(2) RegG, a local-level 
transportation system comprises distances below 50 kilometres and below 60 minutes of 
regional railway travel time. Since the Regionalisation Act went into effect on 1 January 
1996, the federal states are responsible for the organization of this public transportation. In 
return, they receive so-called regionalization funds from the federal government. The federal 
states are entitled to decide for themselves how to offer these services within their borders. 
To plan, organize and award these services, they build up their own institutions on a regional 
or local level and transfer the operation to public or private companies. Details may be found 
in the laws of the federal states.  
 
Since the Regionalisation Act went into effect, public tenders have been an option to award 
the operation of services. Nevertheless, several federal states and their institutions did not 
use the option of a public tender in the past but rather awarded the operation to the state-
owned railway company DB Regio AG. Due to a court ruling by the Federal Supreme Court 
in 2011, the institutions mentioned above are now obliged to tender the operations of these 
services publicly. Since this court ruling, awards without public tenders have been reduced to 
a minimum (Bundesgerichtshof, 2011). This has consequently led to increased intramodal 
competition in regional railway transportation. The market share of those railway companies 
that have not been part of DB AG increased from 17% in 2011 to 25% in 2016, based on 
transport performance (Bundesnetzagentur 2017, p. 117). Overall, 124 railway companies 
offer their services on a regional level by now (Bundesnetzagentur 2016, p. 16). 
 
The public tenders of operations comprise the mode, scope and quality of these services as 
well as the duration of the contracts and pricing of services. The demand side risk can be 
handled individually in these contracts. These contracts can be designed as gross or net 
contracts. According to a gross contract, the demand risk stays with the tenderer. The 
railway company receives a fixed amount of money and transfers all revenue to the tenderer. 
According to a net contract, the demand risk is transferred to the railway company. In many 
cases, the design of contracts arranges for a split of demand risk between the two parties. 
Gross contracts may include incentives for the railway company to foster the demand for 
their services. Furthermore, some contracts may be changed from gross to net contracts 
during the duration of the contract. This allows the railway company to gain information and 
prepare for the future demand risk. On top of that, some contracts may consider the demand 
risk to be with the awarded company within a certain range. Only if this range is not met will 
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the tenderer get involved and take on the excess risks and benefits. Overall, around 50% of 
the contracts are designed with a shared risk (BAG SPNV, 2013). On average, 2.4 bidders 
participate in a tender (Mofair & Netzwerk Europäischer Eisenbahnen e.V, 2015, p. 27).  
 
Overall, the German market for public regional railway transportation services is heavily 
subsidised. On average, 56% of all revenue streams are generated by regionalisation funds 
and only 44% of the revenue streams come from ticket sales. In 2016, subsidies for regional 
railway services have been 5.6 billion euros and will be increased by 1.8% per year 
(Bundesnetzagentur, 2016, p. 30). The market for public transportation services has grown 
significantly within the last ten years. Between 2006 and 2016, the number of passengers 
increased by 25% to an all-time high of 2.632 billion passengers. The average trip length of 
regional railway trips is 20.6 km ((Statistisches Bundesamt, 2017a), (Statistisches 
Bundesamt, 2017b, p. 66)). Since private interurban buses are only allowed to serve 
connections above 50 kilometres and 60 minutes, the public railway transportation system 
only faces intermodal competition for a small share of its overall business.  
 
2.2 The market for interurban bus services in Germany 
Since 1 January 2013, the German interurban bus market is deregulated. Previously, the 
market for interurban bus transport was significantly restricted. Interurban bus services could 
only be offered in accordance with objective criteria, e.g. if Deutsche Bahn AG did not and 
did not intend to offer any service on a certain connection. In addition to this, the bus 
services had to increase the overall service level of the public transportation system. After 
the deregulation of the market, these objective criteria are not applied any more. In contrast 
to the public transportation services, interurban buses are not subsidized. Today, interurban 
bus companies are allowed to choose any connection on their own. They only need to apply 
formally for a connection at the appropriate federal state agency. This application process 
focuses on subjective criteria such as security, performance and expertise of the bus 
company (PBefG, §13, Abs.1). Changes in tariffs or schedules of a connection do not need 
to be approved; they only have to be reported to the appropriate authority (PBefG §45 (2), 
sentence 1 and 2).  
Between 2013 and 2015, several companies entered the market with different connections. 
Since January 2015, a significant concentration process has taken place. The bus company 
FlixBus now has a market share of 90% based on their scheduled kilometres (IGES Institut, 
2017). FlixBus was founded as GoBus in 2011 and renamed as FlixBus in 2013. The 
business model of FlixBus focuses on planning and organizing routes as well as on 
marketing and sales. Midsize bus companies perform operations of services. As a 
consequence, the capital expenditure of FlixBus and competitors with a similar business 
model is quite low, since the midsize operators control the physical assets. This business 
model is the reason for the fast growth of FlixBus. Individual operators perform the 
passenger shipment and share 25% of their revenues with FlixBus. The overall revenues of 
FlixBus and its midsize operators in 2016 is estimated to be 400 million euros (Gorgs, 2017). 
With the help of financially strong investors, FlixBus was able to grow more quickly than the 
market average and take over other competitors. In September 2013, Daimler, the venture-
capital fund of TU Munich, and the Gerog von Holtzbrinck Group took a share in FlixBus and 
invested in FlixBus (Trimborn, 2013). In January 2015, the two biggest players in the market, 
MeinFernbus and FlixBus, announced a merger. They were joined by the investment 
company General Atlantic (FlixBus MeinFernbus, 2015). By the end of 2016, General Atlantic 
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was the biggest investor of FlixBus with a share of 35.4% (Gorgs, 2017). Finally, in 2016, 
FlixBus acquired the European business operations of Megabus and Postbus ((FlixBus, 
2016b)(FlixBus, 2016c)). In addition to this, the US investment company Silver Lake 
announced plans to invest in the company by the end of 2016 (FlixBus, 2016a). 
Interurban bus transport focuses on price-sensitive customers. 61% of FlixBus passengers 
are between 18 and 34 years old. Passengers above 50 years of age only accounted for 
22% of the passengers in the first quarter of 2016. Similarly to low-cost carriers in the 
aviation market, bus operators apply a yield-management system regarding the pricing of 
their tickets. Prices may vary according to demand with the goal of a maximum utilization of 
capacity.   
 
Two different competitors face each other in an intermodal competition between a public 
railway passenger system and interurban bus companies. The public railway transportation 
system has been planned, built up and subsidized for years. On the other side, flexible and 
short-term oriented bus companies with individual profit and cost responsibility focus on 
price-sensitive customers. For a better understanding of this intermodal competition, further 
investigations into the cost structure are necessary.  
 
3 Cost structure comparison of interurban bus companies and regional railway 
transport 
Intermodal competition between the two markets is characterized by significant deviations in 
their respective cost structure (see Figure 1). On average, regional public transport is 
operated at 18.7 eurocents per passenger kilometre. In contrast to that, an average 
interurban bus operator faces costs of 5.3 eurocents per passenger kilometre (BAG SPNV, 
2016, p.79). One of the reasons for this is the significant difference in infrastructure cost. The 
providers of rail services pay fees to DB Netz AG for the use of tracks and train stations. 
These infrastructure fees amount to about 7.3 eurocents per passenger kilometre, 
corresponding to almost 40% of the total cost of regional railway transport. Since bus 
companies do not pay tolls at the moment, they have no infrastructure costs apart from those 
for stations in some major cities. According to the infrastructure cost calculation of the 
German Federal Ministry of Transport, the toll for interurban buses would be 10.3 eurocents 
per vehicle kilometre on motorways and 24.7 eurocents per vehicle kilometre on federal 
highways in 2016 (Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur, 2014a, p. 21). 
Several transport politicians and the Deutsche Bahn AG have repeatedly proposed the 
introduction of a toll for interurban buses. But there is still no legal basis for such a toll. 
Another reason for the disparate cost structures lies in the difference in vehicle cost. Here, 
5.4 eurocents per passenger kilometre for regional rail transport are contrasted with 1.2 
Eurocents per passenger kilometre for bus operators.  
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Figure 1 Comparison of cost structures 
 
Source: Own illustration based on (BAG SPNV, 2016), p. 79 
 
3. Data and model 
3.1. Data sources, data collection and descriptive statistics  
The population observed for this study is based on different transport markets. A transport 
market is defined as the connection between two cities. Each driving direction between two 
cities is defined as a separate transport market. The connection between two cities result 
from a bus route which connects different cities one by one. Therefore, connections are 
different combination options of a route. For this study, all cities with more than 10.000 
inhabitants were combined with each other. In accordance with §42a PBefG, only markets 
with a distance of more than 50 km and a travel time of at least 60 minutes by regional 
railway were taken into consideration. In addition to this, the distance was limited to 400 km. 
While the requirement for the market of interurban buses was a minimum of one journey per 
week, the minimum frequency for the regional railway was one journey per day. All in all, the 
population contains 2,846 transport markets with competition between interurban buses and 
regional railway transport. The data for buses was taken from the Simplex schedule for 
March 2016. The Simplex schedule is a collection of all the schedules of interurban buses. It 
is updated on a monthly basis. Using this collection of schedules, it was possible to gain 
information regarding bus frequencies, trip duration and bus companies. The data for the 
regional railways was taken from the homepage of the Deutsche Bahn. 1 In March 2016, data 
regarding train frequency, average price, connecting trains and average trip duration was 
collected. Finally, the analysis integrates the shortest distances between all pairs of cities in 
                                                       
1 www.bahn.de 
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kilometres2, along with the population data from 2016 3 and the data for traffic volume 
between NUTS 3 zones included in the Plan for Federal Traffic Routes.4  
 
3.2. Descriptive analysis of data 
Using the descriptive statistic in Table 1, one can see that the average distance of the 
considered connections is 211.08 kilometres. That is much less than 299.5 kilometres, which 
is the average distance of all journeys by interurban buses (Statistisches Bundesamt, 
2017b). The question arises of how the offers of interurban buses and regional rail transport 
compete with each other, considering the relatively short distances and the frequencies of 
the two transport modes. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of applied variables 
  Mean Std. Deviation Min  Max 
Kilometres 211.08 93.84 50.50 400.00 
Total population 685.807 799.555 22.131 5.232.640 
Average minutes interurban bus per km  0.98 0.17 0.530 2.17 
Average minutes regional railway transport per km 1.26 0.33 0.560 3.90 
Average bus frequency per day 2.70 3.96 0.143 60.29 
Average regional railway frequency per day  24.50 9.54 1.000 91.00 
Minimum number of train changes 1.38 0.91 0.00 5.00 
Average price per km regional railway transport 0.19 0.05 0.097 0.58 
 
The average trip durations of interurban buses and regional railway transport are contrasted 
in the scope of a comparison of time. That results in a clear time advantage for the interurban 
buses. Over all connections, the bus takes an average of 18.6% less time than the regional 
railway. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the interurban bus travel time advantage. It 
becomes apparent that, on most connections, the bus takes less travel time than the regional 
train. Overall, there are only 458 connections (16%) with a travel time disadvantage of the 
interurban buses. 
 
                                                       
2www.google.de/maps 
3 Municipal directory of the Federal Statistical. Office 
4 NUTS is the abbreviation for Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques. Level 3 corresponds 
to the German districts. 
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Figure 2 Distribution of the percentage average time advantage of interurban buses compared to regional 
railways 
  
 
This advantage in travel time increases with the distance (see Figure 3). Whereas the time 
advantage for distances between 100 and 150 km is 13,44%, it rises to 23,27% for distances 
between 351 to 400 km. Therefore, buses improve their competitive position compared to 
regional rail with increasing distance. It can be assumed that customers switch from regional 
railway travel to interurban buses, in particular over longer distances.  
 
Figure 3 The percentage average time advantage of interurban buses compared to regional railways 
depending on distance 
 
 
Comparing the frequencies of the two means of transport, the regional railway has a much 
higher frequency than interurban buses. 24.50 average train connections on the one hand 
are juxtaposed with only 2.7 bus connections on the other hand (see Table 1). Figure 4 
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shows that there are only a few connections with intense competition. On 2213 (78%) of the 
routes that have been examined, the daily travel frequency is one to three buses. However, 
most of the connections (99%) offer more than nine rail connections per day. There is only 
serious competition between the interurban buses and the regional trail transport concerning 
frequency on 8.8% of the connections. 
 
Figure 4 Histogram of interurban buses and regional railway frequencies 
 
 
In those cases where the bus offers a high frequency, the related rail connection is direct 
connection or with at least one train change. Connections requiring more than two train 
changes by rail have below-average bus service (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5 Average interurban bus frequencies depending on the number of minimum train changes 
 
 
Using the descriptive evaluation, one can see that the intermodal competition between the 
regional railway and interurban buses is limited to a few connections with high frequencies. 
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Intermodal competition rarely takes place in niche markets of the regional railway, but rather 
on routes with direct connections. Overall, the interurban bus has a time advantage, in 
particular for longer distances. One can therefore expect the loss of sales to hit the regional 
railway transport hardest on direct connections and long distances.  
 
3.3 Model 
Initially, the loss of sales can be roughly calculated. In 2016, 24 million passengers used the 
interurban bus. According to a survey by the IGES Institute, 12% of current interurban bus 
customers were formerly customers of regional rail transport (IGES Institut, 2014). In total, 
2.88 million passengers migrated to the interurban bus. The average distance travelled in 
this population is 211.08 km, and the average price of regional rail transport amounts to 19 
eurocents per kilometre. Based on this information, the total loss of sales is calculated at 
115.5 million euros. The goal of the following analysis is to further differentiate the loss of 
sales on the level of connections. To do so, an assessment is conducted in four steps, which 
is explained below.  
 
3.3.1 Calculation of the capacities 
In the first step, the capacity of the interurban buses running between the individual cities is 
determined. The capacity results from the daily frequency of the buses and the average seat 
capacity of a single bus. Consequently, the daily total capacity is projected to a yearly 
capacity. The seat capacity varies with the type of bus. A double-decker bus has around 78 
seats, whereas a standard bus has 49 seats. The appraisal assumes 30% double-decker 
buses and 70% standard buses. The average seat capacity is thus 57.7 seats per bus. The 
formula (1) for the calculation of the total seat capacity of the connection i is thus: 
 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦! = 365  𝑑𝑎𝑦𝑠 ∗ 57,7  𝑠𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑑𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑦  𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛  𝑏𝑢𝑠  𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦! (1) 
 
3.3.2 Calculation of the interurban bus passengers 
In a second step, the number of passengers that actually use the interurban bus between 
cities A and B during one year is determined. For that purpose, the total capacity from 
Section 3.3.1 is multiplied with the average degree of capacity utilization and the probability 
that a person on the bus travels from city A to city B. According to the Federal Statistical 
Office, the mean capacity utilization has been 59%. (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2016). The 
formula (2) to calculate the interurban bus passengers on the connection i between cities A 
and B is thus: 
 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛  𝑏𝑢𝑠  𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠! = 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦! ∗ 59% ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦! (2) 
 
The probability for the connection i depends on the attractiveness of the cities. The more 
attractive cities A and B are, the more people will move between them. Using the logarithmic 
transport volume ln(TV), the attractiveness Si of one connection is calculated compared to 
the mean of all other connections in formula (3): 
 𝑆! = 𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑉!1𝑛 𝑙𝑛 𝑇𝑉!!!!!    (3) 
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The higher Si is the higher the number of people who are actually using the interurban bus 
on the connection i. Subsequently, the S-values are put in order, split into five quintiles and 
each quintile is assigned an increasing probability Pi (see Table 2).  
 
Table 2 Assignment of probabilities 
Quintiles depending on Si Pi 
1. quintile 5% 
2. quintile 15% 
3. quintile 20% 
4. quintile 25% 
5. quintile 30% 
mean 19% 
  
3.3.3 Calculation of the migration 
After the calculation of the number of interurban bus passengers on connection i in 
Section 3.3.2, the third step covers the calculation of the number of migrations. According to 
a survey by the IGES Institute, 12% of the customers of interurban buses were formerly 
customers of regional rail transport (IGES Institut, 2014). The value is used as the mean 
value below. The migration is calculated with the following formula (4): 
 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠! = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑢𝑟𝑏𝑎𝑛  𝑏𝑢𝑠  𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠! ∗ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒  𝑖𝑛  𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠! (4) 
 
Based on an underlying value of 12% and the time advantages of the interurban buses, in 
particular for longer distances, it is expected that more passengers migrate from regional rail 
services to the interurban bus on longer connections than on shorter ones. Therefore, the 
appraisal assumes that the number of migrations increases with the distance travelled. The 
considered connections are differentiated by distance and split into five quintiles. Depending 
on the distance, the following shares of migration are presumed (see Table 3). 
  
Table 3 Share of migration depending on distances 
Quintiles depending on km Share of migration 
1. quintile: 50-106 km  8% 
2. quintile:106,1-140,0 km- 10% 
3. quintile: 140,1-210,5 km 12% 
4. quintile: 210,6- 287,8 km 14% 
5. quintile: 287,9- 400,0 km 16% 
mean 12% 
 
 
 
3.3.4 Calculation of loss of sales 
The final step covers the calculation of the loss of sales for regional rail transport due to the 
parallel traffic of interurban buses. To determine the loss of sales, the individual number of 
migrated passengers from Section 3.3.3 is multiplied with the average price of regional rail 
transport. The loss of sales on a connection between cities A and B thus results in the 
following formula: 
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 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠  𝑜𝑓  𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠! = 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟  𝑜𝑓  𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠! ∗ 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒  𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒  𝑜𝑓  𝑡ℎ𝑒  𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙  𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑤𝑎𝑦  ! (4) 
 
4. Results 
The results of this calculation are illustrated in Table 4, which shows the estimated number of 
interurban bus passengers, the number of migrations, and the resulting loss of sales. The 
results show that there is no cannibalisation problem for regional railway transport caused by 
a parallel interurban bus. Based on this calculation, 2.788 million interurban bus passengers 
migrated from regional railway transport in total. This corresponds to 0.11% of the total 
number of regional railway passengers in Germany (2.632 billion passengers). The migration 
of passengers led to a total loss of sales of 104.38 million euros, or about 1.03% of the total 
sales in the German regional railway industry. It should be noted that the loss of sales is ten 
times more than the number of migrations. This shows that a majority of regional railway 
passengers travel on a distance of up to 50 kilometres, where the absolute tickets prices are 
significantly lower compared to longer distances. Consequently, in particular migrations on 
longer distances lead to a disproportionately high loss of sales.   
 
Table 4 Estimation results 
Category 
  
Number 
of 
markets 
Number of 
interurban bus 
passengers 
migrations Loss of sales 
Share of 
migration 
relative to 
the number 
of regional 
railway 
passengers  
Share of loss 
of sales 
relative to the 
total sales  of 
the regional 
railway 
industry 
total   ∑ 2846 22,214,302.50 2,788,737.78 104,380,007.91 € 0.11% 1.03% 
    ᴓ   7,805.45 979.88 36,676.04 €     
Distance 
in km 
50-150  ∑ 921 7,512,220.18 727,918.51 16,749,504.87 € 0.03% 0.17% 
  ᴓ  
8,562.19 902.16 24,498.68 € 
 
  
151-
250  ∑ 
927 8,002,768.86 1,027,938.70 37,701,652.12 € 0.04% 0.37% 
  ᴓ  
8,632.98 1108.89 40,670.61 € 
 
  
251-
400  ∑ 
998 6,699,313.46 1,032,880.57 49,928,850.93 € 0.04% 0.49% 
  ᴓ   7,088.07 1,053.56 48,219.94 €     
Min train 
changes 
≤1  ∑ 
1.663 16,757,292.28 1,985,402.40 66,657,318.93 € 0.08% 0.66% 
  ᴓ  
10,076.54 1,193.87 40,082.57 € 
 
  
>1  ∑ 1.183 5,457,010.22 803.335,38 37,722,688.98 € 0.03% 0.37% 
  ᴓ   4,612.86 679.07 31,887.31 €     
Average 
interurban 
bus 
frequency 
per day 
> 4  ∑ 
437 13,473,092.33 1,681,995.33 61,962,207.11 € 0.61% 0.61% 
  ᴓ  
30,830.87 3,848.96 141,789.95 € 
 
  
≤ 4  ∑ 2.409 8,741,210.17 1,106,742.45 42,417,800.81 € 0.42% 0.42% 
  ᴓ   3,628.56 459.42 17,608.05 €     
 
In the following section, the loss of sales is analysed for the categories distance, minimum 
train changes, and interurban bus frequencies.  
 
 12 
4.1. Loss of sales depending on distances 
The absolute loss of sales increases with distance (see Table 4). The average loss of sale on 
a connection between 50 and 150 km is 24,498.68 euros, whereas the average loss of sales 
on connections between 251 and 400 km is 48,219.96 euros. This difference can be 
explained by the higher number of migrations on longer distances as well as by the higher 
absolute ticket prices on longer distances. Additionally, it can be seen in Figure 6 that the 
loss of sales per kilometre is particularly high for distances between 150 and 300 kilometres. 
This can be explained by the high interurban bus frequency in this distance category, as well 
as by the declining price structure (price per km) of regional railway services.   
 
Figure 6 Loss of sales per km per year depending on the distance 
 
 
4.2. Loss of sales depending on train changes and interurban bus frequencies 
Regarding the differentiation by train changes, Table 4 shows that the absolute loss of sale is 
significantly higher on routes with direct train connections or with a maximum of one train 
change, compared to connections with more than one train change. The average loss of sale 
with low train changes is 66.66 million euros and corresponds to almost 200% compared to 
the loss of sale on connections with more than one train change. There are much higher 
interurban bus frequencies on these connections, as shown in Figure 5. Consequently, a 
high interurban bus frequency leads to a disproportionately high average loss of sale of 
141,789.95 euros. In contrast, there is only an average loss of sale of 17,608.05 euros on 
connections with four trips or less per day. This observation corresponds to the average loss 
of sale per regional railway frequency in Figure 7. Figure 7 shows the loss of sale 
differentiated by interurban bus frequencies. This figure shows that in particular connections 
with more than nine interurban bus frequencies suffer average losses in sale of 266.793,45 
euros. By contrast, connections with interurban bus frequencies between one and three daily 
trips suffer loss of sales of only 14.838,74 euros per year.  
 
155,22 € 
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129,71 € 
0,00 € 
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100,00 € 
150,00 € 
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Figure 7 Loss of sales per year depending on the average bus trips per day 
 
 
4.3. The ten connections with the highest loss of sale 
Figure 8 shows the ten connections with the highest loss of sale. In Figure 8 the losses are 
the sum of both directions. The highest losses in sale are connections that include Berlin. 
With 3.3 million euros per year the connection between Berlin and Hamburg has the highest 
loss of sales. The ten connections with the highest loss of sale have a distance between 200 
and 300 kilometres. Despite the disproportionately long average distance of 243.1 km, these 
cities are connected with 0.7 train changes on average. This is a significantly better railway 
service level compared to the average train changes of 1.34 train for all connections. The 
high loss of sale on these connections also results from the high average interurban bus 
frequency of 32.58 trips per day. The reason for this interurban bus frequency is the average 
total population of both cities of 3.3 million inhabitants. In contrast, the average number of 
inhabitants for all connections is only 685,807.  
 
 
14.838,74 € 
59.971,52 € 
121.475,25 € 
266.793,45 € 
1-3 4-6 6-9 >9 
average bus trips per day 
Average loss of sales per year 
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Figure 8 The 10 connections with the highest loss of sales per year 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
In contrast to the competition between two privately operating companies, the problem in the 
intermodal competition between regional railway transport and interurban buses is that it is 
not practically possible for regional rail operators to flexibly adjust supply. Since the market 
offer of regional railway companies is determined by contract for several years at a time by 
way of tenders, rail operators only have a limited ability to react to new competitors through 
changes in quantity and prices. Only new tenders can bring about long-term adjustments. 
Depending on the contract design, this can lead to losses on the part of the companies or 
federal states. This study has determined that the losses of sale for regional passenger rail 
transport are not considered to be a significant problem. In fact, only a small share of all the 
considered connections are affected by intense intermodal competition through interurban 
buses. Section 4.4 observed that connections with above-average population and an 
average distance between 200 and 300 kilometres are especially affected by intermodal 
competition. Accordingly, it can be assumed that these connections are transport markets 
with a large transportation volume and profitable operations in these markets. The situation 
raises the question of how important the sale of a connection is compared to the total sale of 
a route. If losses of sales correspond to a significant share of the total sale, it should be 
considered that only transport up to a distance of 50 kilometres is part of the public services. 
Longer connections are the result of different destinations being driven to in sequence. Thus, 
routes between 200 and 300 kilometres are more likely to be considered a product of 
coincidence. 
 
To this end, it should be checked whether there is still cause for public intervention in 
transport on connections with a distance longer than 50 kilometres. This is in particular the 
case if interurban buses and interurban railway sufficiently serve this connection. Depending 
on the incentive and risk structure of the contract, the regional railway operator will try to 
demand higher prices or higher subsidies. Until the next tender process for a route, other 
751.418,49 € 
757.757,24 € 
830.213,55 € 
847.427,43 € 
934.091,38 € 
951.534,83 € 
1.213.272,53 € 
1.664.853,03 € 
1.793.065,90 € 
3.307.849,79 € 
Berlin - Braunschweig 
Berlin - Bremen 
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Frankfurt - Nuremberg 
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Munich - Nuremberg 
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Berlin - Hannover 
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Berlin - Hamburg 
Top 10 loss of sales per year 
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options should be used to minimize the total cost to society. In the long run, the loss of sale 
can be avoided by adapting the tender to the new demand. If a private interurban bus or rail 
operator already serves the market, the regional railway frequency should be reduced.  
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the understanding of the new intermodal competition between 
interurban buses and regional railway transport in Germany. It provides information regarding 
the characteristics of this intermodal competition. The loss of sale was estimated using 
supply-side data. As a result, the hypothesis of cannibalisation has been refuted.  
 
Acknowledgement 
This research has been supported by a seminar thesis and a bachelor thesis. Therefore, the 
author wants to thank Konstantin Ewer and Dominik Frankenhauser for their support. 
  
Literature 
BAG SPNV. (2013). Marktreport SPNV - Ein Lagebericht zum Wettbewerb im 
Schienenpersonennahverkehr 2013. 
BAG SPNV. (2016). Marktreport SPNV 2015/16: Ein Lagebericht zum 
Schienenpersonennahverkehr in Deutschland. 
Bundesgerichtshof. (2011). SPNV unterfällt dem Vergaberecht - Beschluss Az. X ZB 4/10. 
Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Digitale Infrastruktur. (2014). Berechnung der 
Wegekosten für das Bundesfernstraßennetz sowie der externen Kosten nach Maßgabe 
der Richtlinie 1999 / 62 / EG für die Jahre 2013 bis 2017. 
Bundesnetzagentur. (2016). Marktuntersuchung Eisenbahnen 2016. 
Bundesnetzagentur. (2017). Jahresbericht 2016: Märkte im digitalen Wandel. 
FlixBus. (2016a). FlixBus investiert in Technologie und Qualität und gewinnt den weltweit 
führenden Tech-Investor als Partner. Press release from 16.12.2016. 
FlixBus. (2016b). FlixBus übernimmt Fernbusgeschäft der Deutschen Post. Press release 
from 03.08.2016. 
FlixBus. (2016c). FlixBus übernimmt Megabus in Europa und baut Angebot weiter aus. Press 
release from 30.06.2016. 
FlixBus MeinFernbus. (2015). Europa wird grün – MeinFernbus und FlixBus starten 
gemeinsam durch Ziele: Europas innovativster und beliebtester Fernbusanbieter. Press 
release from 09.01.2015. 
Gorgs, V. C. (2017, May 17). Wie FlixBus den Reisemarkt aufmischt. Manager Magazin. 
Retrieved from http://www.manager-magazin.de/magazin/artikel/fernbusmarkt-flixbus-
der-monopolist-a-1142889-3.html 
IGES Institut. (2014). Bahnkunden und Autofahrer lassen Fernbusmarkt wachsen. Press 
release from 17.04.2014. 
IGES Institut. (2017). Fernbusmarkt  : weniger Fahrten bei weiter steigenden Fahrgastzahlen. 
Press release from 29.01.2017. 
Mofair, & Netzwerk Europäischer Eisenbahnen e.V. (2015). Wettbewerber-Report, 
Eisenbahn 2015/2016. 
Statistisches Bundesamt. (2016). Boom bei Linienfernbussen hält an  : 23 Millionen 
Fahrgäste im Jahr 2015. Press release from 07.10.2016. 
Statistisches Bundesamt. (2017a). Jahr 2016: Fahrgastrekorde im Nah- und Fernverkehr mit 
Bussen und Bahnen. Press release from 10.04.2017. 
Statistisches Bundesamt. (2017b). Verkehr aktuell - Fachserie 8 Reihe 1.1 (Vol. 49). 
Trimborn, M. (2013, September 26). Daimler investiert in Mobilitätsdienstleister FlixBus. 
Stuttgarter Zeitung.  
 
